Dealing with an incident
This guide defines what an incident is, how we react to them, and how we follow them up. It’s primarily for technical people, but will be useful to anyone involved in incidents. Anyone can declare an incident, but it is the responsibility of the on-call support person to deal with an incident.
- Identify the problem
- Decide if it’s an incident
- Create an incident channel with /incident
- Appoint an incident lead
- Decide severity - critical, major, or minor (when it doubt, go higher)
Communicate the problem
- If major or critical, post in #general
- Appoint a client comms manager if clients are affected
- Inform the CTO, Head of Tech Ops, and DPO if there is a security or data breach
- Understand, contain, resolve, and monitor the incident
- Schedule a review meeting
- Write up a first draft report and circulate it
- Hold the review meeting
- Write up the final report
What is an incident?
An incident can be any unplanned interruption in or an unexpected reduction in a service’s quality, security, redundancy or performance.
There is no hard and fast rule about what is and isn’t an incident, but generally something is an incident if it:
- Affects security or discloses sensitive data
- Causes data loss
- Causes a site to be unavailable
- Impacts front end users for more than a couple of minutes
- Causes a significant departure from expected behaviour
Incidents are usually acute (short and sharp) problems rather than chronic (long-running) ones. For example known long-term bugs are generally not incidents.
Incidents for which reporting would be appropriate will include
- A site not responding to requests (from a small number of failures to a significant number. I.e. an outage)
- A site is responding to a significant number of requests with an error, eg 503 (although not for expected errors, e.g. 404 for files not expected to exist)
- Supported browsers being presented with errors (e.g. certificate warnings)
- Unauthorised content being made publicly available (e.g. a site defacement)
- Unauthorised exposure of sensitive data. (e.g. user credentials being exposed)
- Any event which triggers a significant warning level on an alerting system
Some things that would be an incident on one site would not be on another. For example a denial of service (DOS) attack would be an incident if it knocked out a smaller site, but would not be one if it just increased load times slightly on a larger site that is attacked regularly.
If you are unsure, then assume it is an incident.
Out of hours alerts
Out of hours is between 18:00 and 10:00, during this time only respond to critical alerts and emergency tickets. You should treat all such alerts as incidents, and you should not be afraid to wake up 2nd line support if you need help.
If the incident is critical or major then you should immediately escalate to 2nd line support. If it’s something less severe, then you should generally escalate it if you can’t fix it within 30 minutes, but you can also escalate it sooner if you think it’s needed.
2nd line support are there to help you, and it is always better to wake them up when they’re not needed than to not contact them when they are needed. When in doubt, wake them up.
Declaring an incident
If you are not a technical person, then your first step should be to inform the on-call support person whose job it will be to go through this process.
Identifying the problem
Your first step should be to understand the problem. How best to do that will depend on the incident, but we mostly run simple websites so the following are always good steps:
- Is the site or server available? Use Airtable to discover the URL
- Check if this alert is a currently known event in ops/docs and read any previous guidance
- Find the available tooling for this site/server, see Airtable and the repo documentation
- Investigate the issue using available tooling to improve our understanding of the impact of this event (looking at logs, metrics etc.)
Once you have identified the problem see if there is an Ops Docs guide for this error.
Declaring an incident
If your preliminary investigation suggests that the problem is an incident, then you should declare an incident. If in doubt, declare an incident. An incident is not a sign of failure.
We have incident.io installed on the dxw Slack for this purpose.
- Type /incident <name> in any Slack channel, the name should be something short but understandable like “example.com errors”
- Give the incident a description, e.g. “We are seeing a large number of 503 errors being returned on example.com”
- Select a severity level (see below)
- Set an incident lead with
/incident lead meor
/incident lead @person– The incident lead does not have to be you and may change over the course of a response (see below).
If it is a major or critical incident, you should post a notice in #general so that everyone is aware. Something along the lines of:
We have been having a security incident with some wordpress sites since 09:00. See [#inc-2021-07-01-mavis-sites](https://dxw.slack.com/archives/C026BN221D5)
We have three levels of severity (based on those used by GOV.UK). To decide which one is most appropriate, we ask three questions:
- What’s the urgency and why?
- What’s the impact on our users and systems?
- What’s the extent of the issue and how many systems and users are affected?
If you’re torn between two categories, opt for the higher one. It’s always better to escalate an issue than to miss something important. We can easily deescalate if things turn out to not be as bad as we thought.
You may find that an incident that initially seems minor turns out to be more severe as you investigate it further.
The most serious kind of incident. This is generally when there’s an outage of one or more sites during a period when they would be expected to be available, or a significant security or data breach such as significant privilege escalation from an unapproved user. Dealing with a critical incident takes priority over all other work and will continue out of hours until the incident can be downgraded.
When major functionality, such as site search, is broken, or there is a small security or data breach. For example flaws allowing for significant privilege escalation from an approved user. This will be dealt with during working hours above other non-emergency work.
This is the lowest level of incident, but will usually still take priority over regular work. Generally, we’ll declare a minor incident if minor functionality or internal tools aren’t working as intended. In terms of software security risks, this covers security risks that may exist on the server for which we are not currently vulnerable to.
For retrospective issues that still need to be treated as incidents, such as a short (minutes) outage for a site outside what might be considered a time of day that the site would be relied on being available. This covers events that may have been retrospectively responsible for availability issues, as well as scans that seem sufficiently novel or deliberately targeted.
Assembling a team
An incident should always have an incident lead. The role of the incident lead is to have an overview of the whole incident, decide what should be done and by whom, and to manage internal comms. They are responsible for ensuring that the response process outlined in this document is followed.
The incident lead is not necessarily the person responsible for the post-incident work. At the end of the incident response, a decision should be made about who does the investigation and write-up, and organises the review.
The incident lead will generally initially be the person who discovered the problem, but may change to whoever is best placed to deal with the problem at any given time. If you are not confident being the lead, you should hand it over to someone more senior.
Many of our incidents are very small, and don’t need multiple people to address them. In those cases the incident lead is often just managing themselves. However, large incidents do need multiple people, and the lead should be delegating work rather than doing it themselves so that they can focus on managing the incident as a whole.
If an incident impacts clients, then a client comms manager should also be appointed. Smaller incidents may not need that.
Both of these positions can be exhausting and if you are at it for a long time you are likely to make mistakes, so if the incident runs for more than a couple of hours then new people should step into these roles.
If the incident is critical, then you should let the CTO (Dom) and Head of Tech Ops (bob) know, as well as our Data Protection Officer (Gurps). If you can’t get hold of these people, post in #general and tell the most senior people you can find.
Responding to an incident
When responding to an incident your goals are to:
- Understand what is happening
- Contain any breach. Revoke any unauthorised access, remove any modifications and identify if any data has been compromised. Preserve data that may be required for later investigation or forensics.
- Restore normal service by taking action to resolve the problem
- Monitor systems to ensure that they continue to operate normally
Communication is key during an incident. Use the incident channel to discuss what you are doing, even if you’re the only one doing it.
Any commands you run and changes you make should be recorded in the channel. This reduces miscommunication, helps keep track of where we’re at, and ensures that no one person is an information bottleneck. It also helps us determine later whether any follow-up work is needed.
After the incident it should be possible to reconstruct what was done based on the channel logs. It’s much easier to record what you’re doing as you’re doing it than to try to remember the next day. We also want to learn how we can improve and prevent incidents in future, and looking at how we respond to incidents is a key part of that. This is not about being able to blame anyone, it is about learning.
The incident.io Slack bot will prompt you to provide a summary every 30 mins, and you can also use it to update the status and log actions (see bot command reference).
This section is for the client comms manager
Often we will become aware of an incident because a client has raised a Zendesk ticket with us, but the incident may also affect other clients.
If you expect to receive a large number of tickets, you should create a parent ticket to assign all related tickets to. This helps streamline the process of communicating with clients.
You should put together a list of email addresses for affected clients. This list may include senior stakeholders as well as our regular contacts, depending on the severity of the incident. The primary source for this is the customer lists in Zendesk.
Client communications should be frequent enough to reassure clients we are working on the problem. We suggest hourly updates to affected clients whilst the incident is ongoing.
Fixing the problem
Once you have an idea of what the issue is, try to determine how to fix it. You should try to test any fix before applying it to confirm that it works and to avoid inadvertently making things worse.
If the fix is a change to the codebase, then the normal deploy process (ie. passing tests and a PR review) should be followed unless there is a very strong reason not to do so.
When to stop
Sometimes it is best to leave the resolution until normal working hours, when more people will be available to help you.
If an out of hours incident has taken more than two hours, you should stop unless you feel you are close or it needs urgent resolution. By this point you should have escalated it to 2nd line support who will be able to help you make that call.
Some clients are more important than others, depending on their public profile and the nature of their contract with us. If you are not sure, assume they are important or ask someone senior.
An incident should be considered resolved when you are confident that you have met all the goals: you understand the problem, have contained it, have restored normal services, and have monitored to ensure the problem is really fixed.
Most incidents require a follow up in the form of a report and a review meeting. Trivial incidents and some recurring incidents (such as DDOSing) don’t require this. If you’re unsure, ask someone more senior.
You should schedule an incident review meeting for about a week later and assign someone the task of drafting the incident report over the next few days. You should ensure that this person has enough time to complete a draft in time to circulate a few days in advance of the incident review.
Writing up an incident
This section is for the person responsible for investigating and writing up the incident. This will not necessarily be the incident lead who responded to the incident.
Most incidents get a report, based on this template, with:
An overview of the incident, including impact figures
- requests/visits/users impacted and over what time
- A timeline of events and response actions
- An explanation of the incident, including contributing factors
- Any proposed actions
This is primarily an internal document, but a condensed version will be made available to the client. You should store it in a new folder in the incidents folder on Drive along with all files relating to the incident.
You should prepare a draft report immediately after the incident, and should focus on the objective data like Slack transcripts, screenshots, and logs. Subjective data like opinions, judgments, assumptions, and beliefs will come up in the review meeting. You should avoid using names to avoid appearing to blame people.
You should circulate the draft to those involved in the incident in advance of the incident review meeting, and any minor amendments should be done as comments/suggestions in the doc. Anything that requires discussion should wait until the incident review. Getting comments in advance helps us make the best use of the meeting time.
‘Draft’ in this case means that all sections should be completed in at least outline form, but there may be some outstanding questions that need answering and some additional detail that is needed. Part of the purpose of the incident review is to fill in these gaps.
You should produce a final version of the report with more detail following the review meeting (see below).
An abridged version with a link to the full report should be published internally on Bikeshed, and copy should be shared with the affected clients (usually through a Zendesk ticket). You should check the client version by Dom for anything that might make us commercially liable, but as a rule we should be as open as possible.
Reviewing an incident
This section is for the incident review facilitator, who should not normally have been involved in the incident response
A few days after an incident, we hold an incident review meeting. These are usually 1.5-2 hours long depending on the complexity of the incident.
The primary goal of the review is learning. We want everyone involved to get a full understanding of what happened and the thinking behind how we responded.
Crucially, the review is not about blame. When reviewing incidents we follow the ‘prime directive’: “Regardless of what we discover, we understand and truly believe that everyone did the best job they could, given what they knew at the time, their skills and abilities, the resources available, and the situation at hand.”
We don’t know enough about our system, which is why something went wrong. For the review to be effective it should be a blameless learning experience. We want to learn about the process of the incident and its handling as well as the technical issues.
The discussion should include the people who responded to the incident, a delivery manager (if there was a client impact, preferably for the relevant client) and any other staff who have an interest:
- People involved in the incident must attend
- People involved with the client should attend
- Available members of the tech team should attend
- Other members of the company can attend
If there is ongoing work with the client (ie. an active sprint) then the sprint team (including the client’s staff) should attend.
If the incident was a major incident, the review should include a senior member of staff not involved in the initial response (a head of something).
Bear in mind that when the audience is large or includes outside parties, people may feel less comfortable speaking up, so you should provide a means for people to raise comments outside of the meeting too.
The meeting should, wherever possible, be facilitated by someone who was not involved in the incident. There should also be a separate dedicated note-taker so that the facilitator can focus on facilitation.
As the facilitator your job is to lead the meeting, picking the key topics of discussion, moderating the conversation to ensure that everyone involved feels safe sharing their story, and checking that everything gets covered. It is recommended that you read through the Structure and Preparation section of Etsy’s guide.
Don’t go through the timeline line by line because this is not a good use of time. Everyone should have seen the timeline in advance and made any necessary comments on it. Instead you should focus on the interesting communication patterns, decision points, observations, and actions that require a deeper dive, using the timeline as a prompt.
The key idea is that when somebody says “X happened” you take the opportunity to ask questions that provide context for X. Not everyone in the discussion will come to the meeting knowing that context, so it’s important not to skip over details as you walk through the timeline.
The review should focus on the how rather than the why. ‘How did the attacker gain access to the database?’ is more useful to us than ‘why was the attacker able to access the database?’, and shifts the conversation away from blame and towards learning. See The Art of Asking Questions in Etsy’s guide.
People may not be expecting this approach, or may be new to incident reviews, so clearly set out the focus of the meeting at the start.
Some key questions:
- What made us declare an incident? What triggered this?
- How did we respond?
- What were the key decision points?
- How did we make those decisions?
- Have we taken all the restorative actions that we need to take?
- Do we have a plan for communicating with the client/s?
How can we do better at responding to incidents?
- How could our processes be improved?
- How could our documentation be improved?
- How could we prevent this kind of incident from happening again?
It is easy to focus on the ‘how could we prevent this kind of incident from happening again?’ part of the discussion and get thinking about preventative actions. This is not the focus of an incident review. If there are major flaws in our setup then we should address these, but many incidents are a result of circumstances that are unlikely to reoccur, and our time would be better spent ensuring that we can respond effectively to all kinds of incidents. Wider discussion points like ‘should we develop a process for auditing package updates?’ should be held for a tech team forum.
Notes should be taken, and it should also be recorded. These files should go in the incident folder.
Coming up with actions is not the goal of the review, but it’s likely that some will be suggested. Try to hold off on discussing them until after you’ve been through everything else so that they don’t end up taking you down a rabbit hole.
Sometimes all the necessary actions will have been taken during the incident, so don’t feel obliged to come up with some actions. Equally you may find that there are many follow-up actions. In that case, try to narrow this down to about three so that they actually get done.
Any actions should be added to the relevant Trello board (the incident actions board for incident specific stuff, the internal tech tools board or tech team leadership board for more general things), given an owner, and dealt with in a timely manner.